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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
This paper explores the scenario of Scotland belonging to EMU as an independent 
country, with the rest of the UK also a member. We consider transitional issues, (the 
order in which various events occur turns out to be potentially crucial), the 
implications of Maastricht, the likely effects on the Scottish economy of being in 
EMU, and finally the policy options open to an independent Scottish government. 
 
2. TRANSITION ROUTE TO SCENARIO 
 
Scotland’s conditions of entry could be quite different, depending on whether 
Scotland joined first as an independent nation, or became independent having already 
belonged to EMU as part of the UK. 
If Scotland became independent after the UK had joined EMU then Scotland’s entry 
could be relatively straightforward. It would be unlikely that Scotland would, in effect, 
be expelled, as long as the new Scottish government undertook to continue to abide by 
the principles of EMU. There is a contrary argument: namely, that the EU might resist 
Scottish entry to EMU on the grounds that this could set a potentially destabilising 
precedent, encouraging some other European regions to seek independence and 
automatic EMU membership. But the special political importance of UK entry into 
EMU could well tip the balance in favour of easing entry for an independent Scotland. 
If the UK were already in EMU, it would be inconceivable that Scotland would adopt 
an interim new currency in order to re-enter at a different exchange rate. Thus options 
would effectively have been closed off for Scotland by already having adopted the 
euro, as a result of the UK having entered EMU.  
Under the converse scenario, of Scottish independence before UK entry into EMU, the 
Scottish government would be faced with important policy questions. In particular, the 
issue would need to be addressed as to whether to issue a separate Scottish currency 
before entering EMU. Possible advantages of doing this include: 
 the symbolic importance for a nation state of having its own currency 
 the possibility it might provide of independence from RUK monetary 
policy 
 the possibility of entering EMU at a lower, more competitive, exchange 
rate than pound sterling  
 as a source of seignorage revenue1   
 as a route through which Scotland might eventually be part of the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and 
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 as a source of better accounting of trade and capital flows. 
There could be advantages in seizing the moment of independence as the best time to 
make a change of currency; such timing might help to counteract some of the political 
and psychological difficulties with introducing a new currency.  
There could be significant difficulties in persuading Scots to switch away from 
pounds sterling as the conventional means of payment, if that was expected to be the 
RUK currency for a long time to come. The level of trade and factor movements 
between Scotland and RUK would remain high after independence. Currencies cannot 
be imposed on a market which displays a preference for another currency. The risk 
would thus be significant of demonetisation (the refusal to accept a particular form of 
money). This risk would be higher if the exchange rate with the pound sterling were 
variable. 
Nevertheless, there are examples of small countries which successfully introduced and 
maintained separate currencies without demonetisation. Although trade with RUK 
may tend to be denominated in pounds sterling, this would be offset by public sector 
transactions in Scotland (including tax payments) being denominated in the Scottish 
currency. Further, the Scottish Parliament could declare the Scottish currency to be 
legal tender, which would reinforce usage.2  
Still, the possibility of demonetisation remains an issue to be faced. The launch of a 
Scots currency could only be reasonably sure of avoiding demonetisation if it were 
pegged one-for-one with pounds sterling. While such a peg would limit the scope for 
any independence in terms of exchange rate policy or monetary policy, the other 
benefits noted above could be sufficient to warrant such a move.  
The alternative to a one-for-one peg need not be floating. There is the possibility of 
pegging at a different rate, chosen to suit Scotland’s relative competitiveness. This 
option would still not allow much scope for an independent monetary policy in the 
run-up to joining EMU, but it would have two distinct advantages. First, in the run-up 
to EMU, it is difficult to support an exchange rate which does not reflect relative 
competitiveness; if the one-for-one rate were too high, Scotland would require access 
to sufficient borrowed reserves to maintain payments balance. Second, it would pave 
the way for entry into EMU at a rate appropriate for the Scottish economy rather than 
the UK economy. While a floating rate might be seen as a better way of establishing 
what that rate should be, exchange rate determination, especially in the short-run, does 
not necessarily reflect relative competitiveness.  
If Scottish entry into EMU were to be long delayed, for whatever reason, then the 
pressure for considering moving away from parity with the pound sterling would 
increase. Indeed the longer Scotland delayed, the more it would have to justify 
eligibility in its own right anyway, so that entry at a suitable exchange rate with the 
euro, independent of pound sterling, would be warranted. 
Regardless of whether Scotland joined EMU before or after RUK, an independent 
Scotland would require the institutional structure of an independent nation. This 
institutional structure would include an independent central bank and a separate bank 
supervisory agency. If Scotland were to become independent and seek EMU entry, its 
central bank governor could belong to the General Council of the European System of 
Central Banks until joining EMU, when membership of Governing Council would be 
available. The greater the involvement of Scotland’s central bank governor, the 
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greater the scope for input into European monetary policy-making. But ultimately, 
Scotland would be tied to the single European monetary policy once she moved to full 
EMU membership. 
Membership of EMU would constrain the powers of a Scottish central bank in further 
respects. EMU would preclude the Scottish government from borrowing from its 
central bank or having the central bank manage its debt. Further, the central bank and 
supervisory agency would need to address the European policy of harmonisation of 
functions (eg deposit insurance) in Europe. Considerable harmonisation has already 
been achieved, but there continues to be significant differentiation of treatment across 
Europe, in terms of accounting, taxation, regulation and conventional practice.  
 
3. POSITION VIS-À-VIS MAASTRICHT CRITERIA 
 
If the UK had already joined EMU before Scotland became independent, the 
Maastricht criteria might be presumed to have been satisfied for Scotland having been 
part of UK. This is more likely to be the case, the sooner after independence Scotland 
sought entry. The longer the delay, the more Scottish entry would be seen as separate 
from UK entry. Once Scotland was in EMU, in any case, the Maastricht Treaty 
requires that evidence be sought that Scotland was continuing to meet the criteria: this 
involves the collection of data such as budgetary deficit, debt to GDP ratio, a general 
price index and the identification of an appropriate long term interest rate. At least, 
following the 2003 Budget Address, there is the prospect of a Scottish consumer price 
series. 
There is therefore a danger that Scotland might not meet the stability criteria due to 
measurement or transitional problems. Further the budgetary criterion might not be 
met if there were a transitional deficit, resulting from the cessation of transfer 
payments from Westminster. This outcome is not certain, however, not least because 
there would also need to be a significant one off transfer to Scotland on independence 
to compensate for loss of joint ownership of a range of UK assets, such as Bank of 
England gold reserves. But considerable uncertainty would be bound to persist for 
some time over an independent Scotland’s budgetary position.   
However, as long as Scotland moved quickly to join EMU it is likely that Scotland 
would be given some latitude to overcome transitional problems in demonstrating that 
the Maastricht conditions were continuing to be met, particularly since any instability 
is unlikely to be dramatic compared to other countries in Europe. 
The situation could be similar for Scotland joining EMU ahead of RUK, as long as the 
UK as a whole had been seen to have met the criteria. It is possible that Scotland 
would have to prove herself fit for entry on the basis of purely Scottish conditions. 
That could pose a major problem: the Maastricht criteria data would have to be 
collected for Scotland, and also satisfy the criteria, over an extended period. But the 
formal requirements for Scotland might be relaxed because of the political 
significance of a Scottish application for entry if there were still doubts about the 
commitment of RUK to eventual entry. 
A separate Scottish currency on independence would provide the machinery for later 
substituting the euro for that currency. Otherwise it would be extraordinarily difficult 
to manage the introduction of the euro in Scotland ahead of RUK. It would also allow 
the possibility of letting the Scottish currency depreciate to a value more suitable for 
the Scottish economy. But it would have to be recognised that anything other than a 
pegged rate could lengthen the process of assessing eligibility, since a separate, 
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floating, currency would invite the need for evidence of currency stability. The 
alternative option of a rate pegged to pounds sterling which embodied an appropriate 
depreciation would prevent any instability: but the judgement as to the appropriate 
degree of depreciation clearly would be crucial. 
Individual countries do not of course have an independent choice as to the exchange 
rate at which they enter EMU. Negotiation is possible, but the existing members 
would determine the rate of entry, whether it was with respect to the pound or a Scots 
currency. In fact the political process would be easier with a Scottish pound. 
Establishing an entry rate for a currency pegged one-to-one with sterling would be 
highly politically-charged, and would have major effects on foreign exchange markets, 
given that this would be read as the rate to be set for later RUK entry. The political 
pressure would be enormous to co-ordinate entry. For Scotland to exercise 
independence with respect to EMU entry, therefore, as long as RUK delayed entry 
beyond Scottish independence, the case is strengthened for a separate currency not 
pegged one-to-one with pounds sterling. 
 
4. LIKELY EFFECTS ON THE SCOTTISH ECONOMY 
 
After EMU entry, the Scottish economy would be subject to a number of major 
external influences. First of all, increased competition in the single European market 
is likely to lead to a continued process of industrial concentration. There is nothing in 
the logic of the single European market to ensure that the concentrated industry is 
evenly distributed between member countries. The overall effect on Scotland is 
unclear, but to the extent that Scotland benefited from industrial concentration, we 
could expect to benefit from productivity gains.  
Our competitive position would also be affected by the parity at which we entered 
EMU. If Scotland joined at the same parity as RUK (whether or not by the route of a 
separate currency pegged to sterling), then Scotland’s current position in Europe 
would be maintained, with an unduly high exchange rate counteracting the scope for 
productivity gains. However, if Scotland were able to join at a lower parity, the 
positive dynamic effects could be substantial. As regards general trade patterns, much 
would depend on relative exchange rates, within the UK, within Europe and also with 
the rest of the world. Scotland could be disadvantaged by being tied to a weak euro, 
but at an over-valued exchange rate on entry. This reinforces the importance of 
considering entry at a lower parity, as well as the wider question of the future 
prospects of the euro in the world monetary system. Overall, assuming Scotland 
entered at a competitive rate, it is likely that EMU entry would increase Scotland’s 
intra EU trade. 
Another important factor is inward investment: membership of EMU would be 
expected to increase inward investment in Scotland from Europe, but the relative 
exchange rate would have a significant bearing on this. In particular, the dollar-euro 
exchange rate could be significant. A weak euro could encourage inward investment 
within the euro-zone, attracted by lower costs. Scotland could benefit particularly, 
with its strong trading links with North America.  
Of particular importance to the Scottish economy is the likely impact on the financial 
sector. The financial sector in Scotland has already been influenced by broader trends 
in global finance. The entire European financial sector has been going through a 
process of restructuring into larger units, with the predominant trend being 
concentration primarily within national boundaries.  
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For Scotland, this process is likely to be complete before independence could 
reasonably be seen to be on the agenda. The sector should be well-placed to compete 
in RUK and more effectively in the rest of Europe on the basis of a single currency. 
The transition mechanism to EMU is, however, likely to be of crucial importance. If 
the Scots currency were to float, this would cause difficulties not only in terms of 
different denominations of currencies for financial assets and liabilities where 
currently there is the one denomination of pound sterling, but there would also be the 
problem of changing valuation along with changing exchange values, and the need to 
hedge against foreign exchange risk. Financial institutions would probably respond by 
continuing to denominate in pounds sterling, which poses a threat of demonetisation 
in Scotland. If there were a fixed parity, however, the required change to procedure 
would be minimal. Given that financial institutions routinely denominate in a range of 
currencies, this is unlikely to be an impediment to the strength of the sector in 
Scotland.  
After EMU entry, the Scottish market would itself be more open to outside 
competition within EMU. Other things being equal, there is always a strong pull 
towards financial centres; the Scottish financial sector is relatively strong in Europe, 
so that it has resisted this pull (in Scotland’s case, to London) so far. It would be of 
tremendous importance for an independent Scotland to ensure the continuing strength 
of the Scottish financial sector: not only with regard to the sector’s contribution to 
output and employment, but also as regards the macroeconomic importance of the 
credit creation and distribution behaviour of the banking system. 
 
5. POLICY LEVERS 
 
Membership of EMU would seriously constrain the policy levers open even to an 
independent Scotland. The Maastricht Treaty means the removal of exchange rate 
policy and monetary policy, as well as significant constraints on the scale of fiscal 
policy. Harmonisation of taxation, regulation and social legislation in Europe put 
limits on the scope for supply-side policies. Nevertheless, harmonisation does not 
mean uniformity, so some policy levers would be available. In particular, the 
composition of taxes and expenditure can be tools of demand management, even 
when the aggregates are constrained by European limits. Scotland could, for example, 
reduce some rates of corporate or income tax relative to RUK as a deliberate attempt 
to influence choices between RUK and Scotland. 
Further, a Scottish government could promote the knowledge economy in ways not 
constrained by harmonisation. First there is scope for a distinctive education policy, 
building on a distinctive historical tradition. Second there is the scope, within a small, 
reasonably cohesive, economy to promote synergies between sectors and firms by 
setting up mechanisms to improve knowledge flows between firms, financial sector 
and government. 
As a nation state member of EMU, Scotland would have a greater say in the design of 
European macroeconomic policy than at present, although with Enlargement of the 
EU, Scotland’s representation on the Commission would be proportionately small. 
However it is likely that the European Central Bank (although not its Executive) 
would continue to have representation from all member central banks, so that 
Scotland would have significant representation as far as monetary policy was 
concerned. 
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As regards the Maastricht criteria, it may be that more lengthy experience of applying 
the criteria might lead to their amendment. Indeed there are already indications that 
the criteria will be modified in the sense that they will be applied to the structural, 
rather than actual, deficits. There would also still be scope for targeting taxes and 
benefits, and expenditures, in such a way as to promote an increase in local demand 
alongside supply side measures. For example, measures to support entrepreneurial 
activity in declining areas through training, seed capital etc could be underpinned by 
measures to enhance demand in the local economy. This could be achieved by careful 
locational direction of government expenditure with an eye on local income 
multipliers.  
Similarly, two major central banking functions are still provided at the national level: 
these are the lender-of-last-resort facility, and bank supervision (although the ECB's 
role is evolving, with more interest now in supervisory issues, for example). The EU’s 
‘home country’ principle puts the onus for supervision on the central bank of the 
bank’s ‘home’ country, so that the potential purview of a Scottish central bank might 
be quite limited. Nevertheless there is scope for a Scottish central bank to enhance the 
climate of quality in Scottish banking, encouraging further strengthening of the sector 
within a Europe-wide market. 
As EMU precludes central banks from lending to government, the Scottish Treasury 
could develop a relationship with the Scottish banks as bankers to the government. 
Because of the central role played by the retail banks in the economic development 
process, there is clearly scope for constructive dialogue with government over 
development strategy, where government can contribute the macro perspective to the 
banks’ more micro perspective. If the government were to be providing the banks with 
the substantial business entailed in handling government accounts, the strength of the 
mutual relationship would be enhanced. 
 
6. CAPABILITY OF ADJUSTMENT TO EXTERNAL SHOCKS 
 
As a member of EMU, Scotland would be vulnerable to shocks arising within EMU. 
To the extent that the business cycle is successfully harmonised within Europe, 
demand shocks would be lessened. However, there are concerns as to how successful 
this harmonisation will be, given that a single European monetary policy may have 
quite different effects on different types of economy, since the economic response to 
changing interest rates is not uniform throughout Europe.  
If intra-EMU trade increases, then the scope for shocks from outside EMU would be 
lessened. However, external shocks would not be eliminated, and could be more 
significant for Scotland than for other members, if we continued our traditional role of 
specialising in entrepôt trade. 
Overall the scope for sector-specific shocks might be increased by the avowed policy 
of concentrating European economic activity in order to reap economies of scale and 
scope. Each member state, but more particularly small member states, will become 
increasingly dependent on fewer industries, and thus more vulnerable to both supply 
and demand shocks. An appropriate strategy for such economies to reduce 
vulnerability would be to diversify in a range of niche markets and specialisms. 
Within the UK, mechanisms exist for Scotland to be cushioned by fiscal transfers to 
address particular regional problems. Such transfers are a well-recognised substitute 
for the exchange rate tool employed within national boundaries. At the European 
level, the scale of funds dispersed to the regions is very small, and the design of 
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Europe is such that it effectively lacks a stabilising fiscal mechanism. As a result, 
stabilisation in Europe has to be achieved by factor flows and, failing that, by income 
adjustment. Capital inflows could finance the trade deficit, but could only be expected 
to do so if alternative investment opportunities arose.  
The relative ease with which factors can move within the UK would provide good 
protection in the case of negative shocks affecting Scotland but not RUK. This 
scenario is thus, in certain respects, more positive, in terms of the capacity to adjust to 
negative shocks, than if RUK were outside EMU. But labour force movements in 
particular are not necessarily ideal as a means of adjustment, as outflows of the more 
mobile (and thus likely most skilled) labour contribute to a dynamic of decline. 
Further, there would no longer be any question of fiscal transfers between RUK and 
Scotland, a factor which other entrants to EMU have not had to consider. 
This point raises issues similar to those raised by industrial concentration within 
Europe, ie issues of the dynamics of growth as opposed to marginal adjustment to 
imbalances. The economic logic of the single European market is to increase 
competitiveness, even if that means concentration of economic activity in the golden 
triangle of south-central Europe. Similarly, the logic of EMU is that the exchange rate 
tool is substituted for by factor movements and/or wage and price flexibility. This 
implies the possibility of significant population movements to high productivity areas. 
The Scotland-in-Europe scenario therefore involves a trade-off between increased 
Scottish self-determination in some respects and the pursuit of welfare at the 
European level in others. It is a real policy issue whether the gains from joining EMU 
might be offset by out-migration of industry and population to other parts of Europe. 
The dynamic and scale of industry and population movement will change with 
Enlargement. While the direct effect on Scotland is unlikely to be significant, the 
indirect effects could be significant in terms of heightening awareness within Europe 
of issues surrounding small, peripheral economies in a large economic market. It is 
conceivable that a more systematic European policy for the (peripheral) regions might 
result. 
In the long-term, if specialisation in Europe does make smaller member states unduly 
vulnerable to negative shocks which cannot be addressed by factor flows, then the 
Maastricht system will tend to be unworkable because it will itself promote economic 
divergence. In these circumstances, Delors’ earlier proposal for a system of fiscal 
transfers may then well be revived in order to maintain economic convergence and, 
more generally, widespread political support. Whether the proposal itself could attract 
enough support is another matter, really to do with the strength of political 
commitment to EMU among the more prosperous members. 
 
7. MECHANISMS FOR MAXIMISING BENEFIT FROM SCENARIO 
 
If the UK had joined EMU before Scottish independence, there would be little room 
for manoeuvre for Scotland prior to EMU entry. However, if the UK had not yet 
joined, there would be scope for Scotland to consider establishing a separate currency 
prior to entry, with a rate against the pound sterling which better reflected Scotland’s 
relative competitiveness. A sustainable fixed rate against sterling would minimise 
exchange instability and would ease Scotland’s entry. The separate currency during 
the transition period would also allow for a separate Scottish institutional structure to 
support Scotland’s presence in EMU. Scotland could also take advantage of the more 
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favourable exchange rate and the capacity to introduce measures to encourage growth 
of its key sectors, to take advantage of the scope offered by the European market. 
Irrespective of entry route, the high degree of integration between the Scottish and 
RUK economies (and in particular their factor markets) could provide a cushion for 
Scotland in the face of particular sectoral shocks. Such shocks could well be highly 
significant for a small country in Europe, within which concentration and 
specialisation are being encouraged. Nevertheless, on the downside, factor mobility 
can sometimes be disequilibrating, with factor outflows from lower-return economies 
further weakening economic conditions.  
The institutional structure of EMU would give Scotland a say in the design of 
European monetary policy. Some traditional central banking functions might be 
undertaken by bodies other than the Scottish central bank: the Scottish Treasury 
would act as government banker and a separate supervisory agency might undertake 
bank supervision. There would be more latitude here for national policy. Both would 
involve building up a strong mutually-beneficial relationship with the financial sector, 
particularly the banks. This in turn would lead to a mutually-beneficial forum for 
implementing the financial side of industrial policy.  
More generally, the Maastricht restrictions are specified at the aggregate level and 
leave open possibilities for demand-side as well as supply-side measures within those 
aggregates. Although taxation and regulation are being harmonised across Europe, this 
does not mean uniformity, so that there would still be some scope for policy addressed 
to particular Scottish problems and possibilities. 
 
8.  CONCLUSION 
 
We have considered here the scenario of both an independent Scotland and the rest of 
the UK being part of EMU. As for the UK as a whole, the issues for Scotland would 
arise from the particular opportunities created by membership of the euro-zone on the 
one hand, and the limitations placed on policy autonomy on the other. Joining EMU 
might seem to imply giving away the scope for policy autonomy which Scotland 
would achieve with independence. But as a separate member, Scotland would have its 
own voice in influencing European policy-making. Further, the policy harmonisation 
process in Europe does not mean uniformity - there would still be scope for some 
differentiation in policy-making and policy implementation, such as is feasible within 
a small, relatively cohesive economy like Scotland. 
For Scotland, a crucial issue would be the exchange rate at which she entered EMU. 
Ideally the process of joining would allow a depreciation relative to the rest of the UK. 
If independence were to arise after the UK had joined EMU, it would be most unlikely 
that there could be any question of a different exchange rate for Scotland's entry, even 
if Scotland had to start from scratch in demonstrating that the convergence criteria had 
been met. But if Scotland were to seek to join EMU before the rest of the UK, there 
could be strategic advantages in establishing a new interim currency in the transition 
period, allowing for Scotland then to enter EMU at an exchange rate suited to Scottish 
economic conditions. 
